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COMMENT
THE ENVIRONMENT: AN AGENCY-COURT BATTLE
Administrative law has long been preoccupied with the task of
striking an appropriate balance between judicial and administrative
activities. From the turn of the century, when administrative law was
only beginning to acquire an academic and professional identity,'
through more recent debate concerning the proper function of
independent regulatory agencies as agents of the government in
America,2 a recurrent theme of conventional wisdom has been that
most administrative law issues can be viewed as the allocation of
power between the administrative agencies and the reviewing courts.
Questions involving the scope of judicial review of agency action or
the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, may under this approach be viewed as inquiries into
whether it is more desirable to have a court or an agency exercise
supervisory control over some aspect of American life. Even the
language employed by the courts in considering such questions,
invariably glossed with such terms of art as "expertise," "administra-
tive discretion," and "substantial evidence," suggests a significant
preoccupation with power allocation. A court's deference to the
"expert" judgments of an agency can be thought of as an implicit
concession of supervisory power; a court's refusal to find that an
agency determination has been based on "substantial evidence" can
be read as implying suspicion of the agency's supervisory com-
petence. This method of analyzing the interaction between adminis-
trative agencies and reviewing courts has been so dominant in
administrative law in the last thirty years3 that any other approach
may seem eccentric. Yet the allocative approach reflects concerns
that were not the primary interests of the founders of the modern
regulatory agency and tends to deemphasize issues which at one time
were the major battlefields of administrative law-issues such as the
constitutionality of legislative delegations of law making power to
1. See generally T. Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law; T. Goodnow, Principles
of Administrative Law of the United States; Schwartz, The Administrative Agency in His-
torical Perspective, 36 Ind. L. R. 260 (1961).
2. Compare Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. R. 713 (1969), with
Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 Harv. L. R. 1183 (1973).
3. T. Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts; R. Jackson, The Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy.
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the agencies and the worth of uniform national regulatory standards.
The contributions of the reviewing courts reoriented the focus of
administrative law toward the appropriate allocation of functions
and power between the courts and the agencies.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, agencies, as opposed to
the courts, are deemed the appropriate entities to make initial
decisions that are in some sense adjudicative. This doctrine was one
of the early devices utilized for establishing agency autonomy. An
initial justification for the doctrine was uniformity. The uniformity
rationale for upholding agency decisions became increasingly inade-
quate, however, as more ambitious schemes of regulation through the
agencies were formulated. The goal of enthusiasts for agency govern-
ment was to carve out an area of agency supremacy in order to infuse
expertise, efficiency, and integrity into the governing process. They
were concerned with nothing less than the revitalization and modern-
ization of the American governmental apparatus. The primary juris-
diction doctrine constituted, in their view, a recognition by the
courts of the inherent superiority of regulatory agencies in the per-
formance of certain tasks.
The courts in the early part of the Twentieth Century through a
series of decisions involving the I.C.C. upheld the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction and attempted to develop discerning standards of review.
In sum, the court developed four principle criteria to aid in defining
administrative functions and in determining whether or not the
exercise of primary agency jurisdiction was indicated in a particular
context: (1) whether the complexity of the social problem neces-
sitated that it be addressed by a body of experts with specialized
training; (2) whether the question presented was one that could be
conclusively resolved in one sitting or was one that required the
continued involvement over time of the decision making body; (3)
whether the controversy presented questions that were by their very
nature administrative; and (4) whether particular issues raised were
issues of fact or law.4 The first two criteria served to define the third
by providing justifications for why a particular set of issues required
the use of techniques that in themselves serve to define the functions
and purposes of an administrative agency. The fourth criterion
4. See Texas and Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907);
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Solum, 247 U.S. 477 (1918); Great Northern Railway v.
Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923).
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defined facts in a special way: evidence that, for reasons suggested in
other criteria, an agency was peculiarly suited to assess.'
These criteria became the principal devices for allocating power
between the courts and the regulatory agencies in modern America
and, beyond that, a source of post World War II justifications for the
regulatory agency form of government. From them have been
derived the standard arguments on behalf of agency control; exper-
tise, public-mindedness, flexibility, and the peculiar ability to gather
and analyze factual information. In developing these criteria, the
courts went far toward formulating a rationale for the continued
presence of regulatory agencies in the American governmental
process. As current social problems came to be perceived as complex,
the appropriate institutional virtues required for their solution
became expertise, efficiency, and flexibility. The courts, however,
were not unqualifiedly enthusiastic about the virtues of the agency
form of government. They viewed it, rather, as having distinct limita-
tions.
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
If the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be said to have invited
the formulation of a rationale for agency power; questions involving
the scope of judicial review of agency activities stimulated discussion
of the limits of that power. Whereas the former doctrine determines
whether the court or the agency should make a particular decision in
the first instance, the scope of review determines those issues which
the court may finally resolve after the agency has initially decided
them. The literature of judicial review of administrative action sug-
gests that decisions defining the scope of review can be viewed,
ultimately, as indications of the extent of public confidence in the
agency's governing abilities. Whether an agency or a court is the
preferred supervisory unit for a particular area of conflict-generating
activity may be determined by the extent to which particular qual-
ities, relevant and desirable in that area, are perceived as charac-
teristic of the one unit or the other. In the early part of the Twen-
tieth Century, while regulatory agencies had become an approved
part of the system of American government, the justifications for
their power had been only vaguely formulated and the limitations
upon that power had yet to be fixed. Thus, there existed a sub-
5. The last criterion implicitly raises the question of whether there were limits on the
power of the regulatory agencies to gather facts as opposed to analyzing them. In United
States v. Abilene & S. Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924), Justice Brandeis considered this question
and held, for the Court, that an agency could not rely in making its decisions on evidence
that had not been introduced into the record.
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stantial interface between the areas of clearly administrative and
clearly judicial activity; the extent to which the agencies would come
to preempt that area was to be largely determined by the courts' own
definition of the proper scope of judicial review of administrative
action.
The courts in attempting to clarify the definition of the proper
scope of judicial review reached many different outcomes suggesting
that there were difficulties with an undifferentiated application of
the model of agency government that had been conceived in the
context of economic regulation of large industrial enterprises. To the
courts effective government in America depended on governmental
institutions having a clear sense of their purposes and limitations.
Regulatory agencies had been created to meet a special need that
courts and legislatures were less capable of fulfilling: the resolution
of social problems which, because of their recent origin, complexity,
and changing shape, necessitated the continued attention of a body
of experts. The experimental and amorphous character of solutions
to these types of problems called for flexibility and discretion in the
presiding officials; imposition by the courts of too rigid a set of
functional limitations on those officials ran counter to the purposes
of the regulatory agencies. Thus the court assumed the position that
they should be prepared to defer to administrative discretion in the
performance of specialized regulatory tasks.
And yet the courts recognized that they would be remiss in the
performance of their duties and functions if they failed to provide a
forum for review of administrative activity. More specifically, in the
process of review the courts had to insure that the discretionary acts
of officers or commissions conformed to the specific purposes
underlying the administrative regulation, as well as to any constitu-
tional limitations on the reach of the regulatory capacity. Thus the
court attempted to establish a flexible continuous agency-court
partnership in which the "division of labor" would be made on the
basis of the peculiar capabilities and ultimate responsibilities of the
respective "partners." The "senior partner," the judiciary, would
defer to the specialized competence of the agencies whenever its
constitutional responsibilities, coupled with considerations of
efficiency and expedition, permitted it to do so. But in matters of
ultimate judicial responsibility, such as the custodianship of the
protection afforded by the Bill of Rights, the courts would retain full
supervisory and reviewing power, regardless of more pragmatic con-
siderations.
The controversy over air quality deterioration illustrates the diffi-
culties of the agency-court partnership involving the Environmental
[Vol. 17
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Protection Agency (EPA). In 1970, Congress enacted a stringent and
detailed air pollution control statute, the Clean Air Act.6 At virtually
the same time, the President created a new agency, EPA, to mold and
enforce the federal environmental protection program. Increasingly
the EPA has used informal rulemaking to regulate many areas and
the courts have had to struggle to define exactly what their task is on
review. The basic controversy centers on both the appropriate stan-
dard and the scope of substantive review and the appropriate scope
of review of informal rulemaking. Since the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) does not establish a standard specifically for
review of informal rulemaking, there has been some confusion over
the appropriate statutory standard to apply to the substantive review
of agency rules. Recently, however, the courts have agreed, at least
with respect to informal rulemaking under the Clean Air Act, that
section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the
correct standard. This section allows a reviewing court to set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." 7
The Supreme Court has employed this standard in reviewing in-
formal rulemaking,8 but its initial discussion of the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard came in a case involving informal agency action
other than rulemaking. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, the Secretary of Transportation had approved a plan to con-
struct a federal highway through a Tennessee park, despite a statu-
tory restriction that he expend federal funds to finance highway
construction through public parks only if there were "no feasible and
prudent" alternatives.9 The Court held that under the "feasible and
prudent" mandate, the Secretary was entitled to weigh the destruc-
tion of parks against the cost of other routes, safety factors, and
other interests favoring parkland highways; but he could allow con-
struction in public parks only if the alternative routes presented
"unique problems" of cost and community disruption.' I The Court
further held that the informal action would be subject to substantive
review by the district court under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review. Explaining this standard, the Court noted that the
Secretary's decision was entitled to a presumption of regularity'
6. Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. V, 1965-69)
(codified as scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970)).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
8. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
9. See 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
10. 401 U.S. at 413.
11. Id. at 415.
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and that the "ultimate standard of review is a narrow one" under
which a "court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency." 1 2 But the Court clearly indicated that this standard
did not imply mere pro forma review. 1 3
Although Overton Park sets forth the generally accepted standard
of review of informal rulemaking, there exists considerable disagree-
ment over the scope of judicial evaluation of agency action permitted
or mandated by that decision. By requiring the agency to bring a
"full administrative record" before the reviewing court, Overton Park
appears at a minimum to reject the traditional "rational basis" stan-
dard of substantive review. Under that standard the reviewing court
accepts at face value the factual assumptions of the agency for which
there is a rational basis and refuses to require evidenciary support for
the factual premises underlying the rule.1 4 The rational basis stan-
dard allows judicial review even without a record that includes the
factual data and reasons upon which the agency promulgated its rule.
In requiring an agency to make available in an administrative record
the basis of its action, the Court in Overton Park apparently at-
tempted to facilitate a more searching judicial substantive review of
informal agency action.
Two recent decisions reviewing EPA regulations promulgated in
informal rulemaking under the Clean Air Act are Ethyl Corp. v. EPA
and South Terminal Corp. v. EPA. Is Both emphasize that Overton
Park required judicial review of the record not only to ensure that
the agency "considered all the relevant factors," but also to discern
any "clear errors of judgment." 1 6 Thus within the "clear error of
judgment" scope of review, both courts acknowledged that they are
under an obligation not to substitute their judgment for that of EPA.
Nevertheless, the courts inquired into the rationality of EPA deci-
sions on factual issues, regulatory objectives and implementing tech-
niques in order to establish "parameters of rationality within which
the agency must operate."1 " Thus the Ethyl Corp. and South Ter-
minal cases indicate that within this searching scope of review, the
court will focus on four elements of the agency's decisionmaking
power in reviewing for arbitrary and capricious actions.
First, the court will focus on the quality of the factual evidence
12. Id. at 416.
13. Id. at 415.
14. Id. For a pre-Overton Park application of the "rational basis" standard, see Superior
Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963).
15. 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973); 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
16. 478 F.2d at 47-49 (Ethyl Corp.); 504 F.2d at 655 (South Terminal).
17. 504 F.2d at 665.
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upon which EPA based its regulatory decisions; these decisions must
be based on valid data and methodology. For example, a rule
founded on engineering statistics derived through unproved method-
ology may be held to be "arbitrary and capricious." Second, the
reviewing court will scrutinize the agency's decision for a "logical
connection" between the raw factual data and the regulatory deci-
sions made. Third, even where the agency can point to valid data and
methodology supporting its decisions, the court will examine the
record for countervailing evidence, striking down the rule if such
evidence is "so overwhelming or so persuasive" that the court must
conclude the agency erred in its decisionmaking process. Finally, the
reviewing court will assure itself that EPA has thoroughly examined
alternative methods of regulation.
Ethyl Corp. and South Terminal, the major recent cases reviewing
EPA informal rulemaking pursuant to the Clean Air Act, indicated
that the nondegradation regulations will be reviewed under a "clear
error of judgment" scope of review. In applying the "clear error of
judgment" standard to the regulations, the reviewing court will en-
counter the complicating fact that EPA has engaged in a cost-benefit
balancing of social, economic and environmental factors. Some
courts have found the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
not only to demand agency disclosure and consideration of environ-
mental harm in reaching decisions on proposed action, but also to
impose limits on the substance of that action.' 8 These courts have
held that the NEPA mandate requires agencies to balance the en-
vironmental harm against the benefits of a planned project and also
requires the courts to review the substance of the balance.1 9
Although review of an agency's balance of enviromental and socio-
economic factors is not new, it is always complicated by the subjec-
tive nature of the agency's determination. For example, when an
agency is balancing environmental factors it is often confronted with
costs and benefits that cannot be objectively quantified. As a result,
the review of such a balance becomes essentially untestable subjec-
tive good faith. Thus where it is clear that the standard of arbitrary
and capricious is the standard of substantive review utilized by the
courts, under NEPA the scope of substantive judicial review is some-
what larger than that established by the "clear error of judgment"
test.
18. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.
1974).
19. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972).
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THE CLEAN AIR ACTS AND NEPA
Prior to 1970, federal efforts to regulate and control air pollution
were marked by frustration. The Air Quality Act of 1967,20 though
an improvement over earlier legislation,2 1 was ineffective in abating
air pollution both because it relied on each state to implement its
own regulatory program and because it imposed no deadlines for
compliance by polluting industries. The Clean Air Amendments of
1970,22 corrected both of these deficiencies. Although this legisla-
tion retained the 1967 Act's declaration that the states are primarily
responsible for preventing and controlling air pollution, it substan-
tially increased the federal government's role in pollution control and
effectively confined state responsibility to the implementation and
enforcement of a national pollution abatement program.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)2" estab-
lishes a national policy of environmental protection2 4 and directs
that all federal agencies follow certain operation procedures intended
to effectuate that policy. The most important of these procedural
requirements is that any agency undertaking a "major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" must
prepare an environmental impact statement.2 ' That statement must
include a detailed discussion of the environmental impact of the
proposed action, the unavoidable adverse environmental conse-
quences that would result from the implementation of the proposal,
and the possible alternatives to the proposed action.2 6 Compliance
with these and other mandates of NEPA may impose a substantial
burden on an agency, a burden which will often tend to interfere
with the agency's traditional functions. Significantly increasing the
burden imposed on federal agencies by this requirement of NEPA are
the actions of environmentalists and others opposing federal projects
who have employed the impact statement requirement as a useful
legal weapon by attacking purported agency compliance with the
requirement on a variety of grounds. Among these lines of attack
have been challenges of the accuracy of an agency determination that
an impact statement is not required with respect to a certain agency
action, the sufficiency of impact statements which have been pre-
pared, and the validity of an agency's decision to implement a proj-
20. Pub. L. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
21. Air Pollution Act of 1955, Ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
22. Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. V,
1965-69).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-47 (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (1970).
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ect after the preparation of an impact statement. Resolution of these
challenges has required the courts to attempt to balance the often
competing interests of environmental protection and administrative
efficiency, both of which are recognized in the vague language of the
National Environmental Policy Act.
The standard of review under NEPA is somewhat different from
the standard of review under the Clean Air Amendments. Under the
Clean Air Amendments, the standard is "arbitrary and capricious,"
but under NEPA the standard is "significant effect." The NEPA
"significant effect" standard, however, goes to the threshold ques-
tion of whether an impact statement is required at all; whereas the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is directed toward a determina-
tion of whether an entire action by the EPA is in compliance.
Thus the legislative enactments tend to establish preliminary
guidelines for judicial review of administrative actions. The case law
serves to elaborate upon these broad guidelines, seeking to delineate
the scope and standards of the reviewing court's power. The standard
of "significant effect" set out by the NEPA is the standard which it
utilized in determining all initial and threshold issues. The standard
of "arbitrary and capricious," outlined in section 706(2)(A) of the
Administrative Procedure Act is utilized in the determination of the
issue of whether the action of the agency falls within the permissible
limits. Thus it is clear that the scope of substantive judicial review of
administrative actions with regard to the environment and the gov-
ernmental policies surrounding that area is exceedingly broad. Fur-
ther, since agencies seem to have entered the era of rulemaking, this
broad judicial review has become particularly amenable to adopting
quasi-judicial procedures-formal hearings, oral arguments, cross-
examination and the like-which are clearly not required by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' '
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
That the judiciary should presume to impose its own methods on
administrative or executive officers is a usurpation. And the assump-
tion that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of
Courts of justice is wholly unfounded.
-Lord Shaw in Local Government
Board v. Arlidge (1915) A.C. 120.
Congress has fastened the courts and agencies into an intimate
partnership, the success of which requires a precarious balance be-
tween judicial deference and self-assertion. In passing on administra-
27. 5 U.S.C. § 551-706 (1970).
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tive adjudications, the courts over the years have learned to maintain
that balance, but judicial review of rulemaking is presenting a new
and troublesome problem. Some courts have recently shown an in-
clination to force rulemakers to adopt quasi-judicial procedures. As
this tendency becomes general, rulemaking loses most of its peculiar
advantages as a tool of administrative policymaking. The trend in
agencies toward over proceduralization arose largely because of re-
viewing courts and their hostility toward regulations and their fond-
ness of resolving social controversies through adjudicatory methods.
From these tendencies a general paralysis of the administration has
resulted.
While procedures for rulemaking, like those for adjudication,
should no doubt promote fairness, that slippery term has very differ-
ent meanings in the two contexts. An adjudication applies a preexist-
ing legal standard to a small set of controverted facts to determine
whether a particular individual should receive a benefit or a penalty.
An adjudication is fair to the individual only if the facts are accu-
rately found, and Anglo-American jurisprudence assumes that
accuracy is best served by traditional adversary proceedings. But it
makes no sense to speak of a rule as being fair or unfair to an
individual in this objective sense of accuracy. A rule allocates bene-
fits and penalties among large classes of individuals according to a
specific normative standard, and the fairness of such an allocation is
ultimately a political or philosophical question.2 8 Thus, in the rule-
making context, fairness is not identified with accuracy, and pro-
cedures designed to maximize accuracy at the cost of all other values
are simply inappropriate.
Although a rulemaker's decisions cannot be accurate in the con-
ventional sense and regulated parties have no fundamental right to
participate in rulemaking, the administrator owes a duty to the pub-
lic to give serious consideration to all reasonable contentions and
evidence pertinent to the rules he is considering. The APA provides
rulemaking procedures which directly enforce this duty. Section 553
imposes a three-fold obligation on the rulemaker. First, the rule-
maker must give the public notice of the "legal authority under
which the rule is proposed" and of "either the terms of substance of
the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues in-
volved," at least thirty days before its effective date. Second, he
28. Although a rulemaker may make use of empirical conclusions, these are so dependent
on predictions, and on inherently uncertain estimates, that objective terms such as "accu-
rate" and "inaccurate" will typically have little application. Further, because a rulemaker
must make and coordinate many empirical and normative judgments, the ultimate shape of
the rule seldom "follows the facts."
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must "give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Finally, "after
consideration of the relevant matter presented," the rulemaker must
"incorporate in the rules adopted a concise and general statement of
their basis and purpose."2 9
If accorded a properly expansive reading, section 553 provides a
fully adequate scope for procedural judicial review of rulemaking.
Section 553 contemplates that rules will be made through a genuine
dialogue between agency experts and concerned members of the pub-
lic. In policing the procedure, the reviewing court must satisfy itself
that the requisite dialogue occurred and that it was not a sham.
There is an important difference between interpreting section 553
creatively and simply disregarding it. That section mandates a dia-
logue, not a trial. Nothing in section 553 says that a rulemaker must
give individual answers to critical interrogatories, allow for oral hear-
ings or provide for the cross-examination of experts. Some recent
lower court decisions, however, have urged upon rulemaking agencies
a variety of procedures not found either in section 553 or in the
particular agency statutes under review. In International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus,3" the EPA had decided not to suspend for one
year the Clean Air Act's 1975 standards for auto emission control.
The Act permitted a suspension only if the EPA Administrator deter-
mined that the technology necessary to meet the 1975 standards was
not "available." 3 1 Because the Administrator had determined the
availability of such technology by means of complex "prediction
methodology" never revealed to the auto companies, the court re-
manded the case to the EPA to give "the parties an opportunity to
address themselves to matters not previously put before them." 3 2
Arguably, this conclusion followed directly from the notice require-
ment in section 553 of the APA, for the methodology itself was an
important issue which the EPA should have publicized for comment
and criticism before announcing its final decision. The court further
held, however, that "in the remand proceeding... we require reason-
able cross-examination as to new lines of testimony, and as to sub-
missions previously made to EPA in the hearing on a proffer that
critical questions could not be satisfactorily pursued by procedures
previously in effect."' a 3 It is true that the opinion permits the EPA
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
30. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5)(D)(iii) (1970).
32. 478 F.2d at 649.
33. Id. at 649.
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to "confine cross-examination to the essentials, avoiding discursive or
repetitive questioning." 3 4 But the fact remains that neither section
553 nor the Clean Air Act requires any cross-examination procedure
for rulemaking.
Although International Harvester departs from the APA some-
what, the distinctions between informal rulemaking procedures3
and full adjudicatory procedures 3 6 have been discarded as criteria
for determining the type of hearing to which the parties affected by
the administrative action are entitled.3 Courts devise mandatory
procedures according to the kind or the importance of the issues in
the proceeding. Hearings, for instance, are deemed necessary when-
ever a genuine and substantial issue of fact has been raised by means
of an offer of proof, or at least when the issue presented is one which
possesses great substantive importance, or one which is unusually
complex or difficult to resolve on the basis of pleadings and argu-
ment. This curious ad hoc approach to procedural review is not
authorized by the APA or by any other statute; nor should it become
law by judicial fiat.
The ad hoc approach contravenes recent, authoritative interpreta-
tions of the APA. These interpretations make it clear that an agency
does not "abuse its discretion" by declining to utilize procedures
more formal than those set out in section 553. If the APA precludes
the ad hoc approach, then that approach can survive only if the
Constitution requires it; there is not even a colorable claim to this
effect. Of course, the due process clause often confers quasi-judicial
procedural rights on an individual who becomes the focus of a gov-
ernment action. 3 8 However, all governmental actions must be
surrounded by procedures representing a reasonable balance between
fairness and efficiency. For rulemaking purposes, however, the fair-
ness is owed to the public generally, not to particular individuals.
Thus there is no reason to doubt that the procedures of section 553
strike other than a reasonable balance.
CONCLUSIONS
In this "new era" 3" of environmental, economic and energy reg-
ulation, there is a great attraction to any approach which genuinely
34. Id. at 649.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
36. Id. at § 556.
37. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1973).
38. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
39. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Rucklshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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facilitates substantive review of agency rules. But how do the diffi-
culties of substantive review justify adopting the ad hoc approach to
procedural review? One suggestion made by Judge Bazelon in Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus4" argued that the ad hoc
approach could and should virtually replace substantive review;
reasoning that agency use of adjudicatory procedure would guarantee
the substantive adequacy of agency rules. Judge Bazelon expressed
the fear that in many new areas of rulemaking, the exercise of sub-
stantive review dangerously taxes the court's competence, converting
them into superagencies charged with second guessing the techno-
logical, scientific, and economic judgments of rulemakers. Another
suggestion accepts the need for a wide ranging substantive review and
argues that rulemakers must be forced to embrace adjudicatory pro-
cedures so that an adequate record will be developed for such re-
view.4
To both of these suggestions, there is a threshold objection: each
tries to facilitate substantive review at the cost of paralyzing agencies
with procedures otherwise irrelevant to sound rulemaking. Surely the
court's task can be made tolerable without rendering rulemaking a
practical impossibility. Furthermore, both suggestions misconceive
the role of substantive review. Since the APA not only disallows the
ad hoc approach to procedural review, but also requires substantive
review, Judge Bazelon's proposal is doubly doubtful and unneces-
sary. Substantive review under the APA does not convert the review-
ing court into a superagency. The APA standard of review is a
singularly undemanding one and it allows adequate play to Judge
Bazelon's perception that courts can often better assess the way rules
are made than the merits of the rules themselves. Furthermore,
courts do not need an adjudicatory record to undertake the neces-
sary task of substantive review. Rather, they can and should review
the legally sanctioned record of rulemaking which must be generated
as a matter of course by section 553 procedures.
Under section 706 of the APA, the reviewing court must-strike
down not only those agency rules which are "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,"
but also those actions which are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 4 2 Presumably,
the first standard means that an agency rule must conform to the
Constitution. However, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard goes
beyond this. It applies to the factfinding, fact predicting, and factual
40. 478 F.2d at 650-53.
41. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1970).
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reasoning processes which led the agency to adopt the rule. Although,
in the Overton Park case, the Secretary of Transportation's actions
was not a "rule" in the APA sense, the Court nevertheless applied the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of section 706 of the APA. After
Overton Park it is doubtful that courts can simply avoid substantive
review of rulemaking, no matter how many "procedures" are im-
posed on the rulemaking agency. Thus, Overton Park requires that
agency action be "based on a consideration of the relevant fac-
tors,"'43 and therefore it seems to require not an evaluation of the
rulemaker's empirical conclusions but rather an inquiry into the basic
orderliness of the process by which evidence and alternative rulings
are considered.
This analysis of substantive judicial review undermines Judge
Bazelon's proposal that substantive review be replaced by the ad hoc
approach to procedural review. Judge Bazelon's perception that the
courts can more competently assess the rationality of the rulemaking
process than the merits of the resultant rules is correct. The problem
with the ad hoc approach to procedural review is that it goes well
beyond this sound perception. The ad hoc approach mandates that
the courts prescribe precise and formal methods for bureaucratic
policy making. This mandate presumes an expertise in administrative
science which duty on the bench simply does not confer. By con-
trast, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of substantive review
authorizes the courts merely to scrutinize the actual making of the
rule for signs of blind prejudice or of inattention to crucial evidence;
a task of straight forward detective work which is well within the
capacities of generalist judges. Replacing substantive review with the
ad hoc approach to procedural review would make sense only if
adjudicatory formalities constituted both a necessary and a sufficient
condition for the rulemaking process to be rational. Neither branch
of this proposition is sound. Rulemaking is adequately rational,
under the APA, so long as the administrator is presented with all
relevant evidenciary factors, gives serious consideration to those fac-
tors, and uses reason rather than whim to progress from initial
assumptions to final conclusions.
When based on a proper administrative record, the mechanics of
review are quite straightforward. If the subject matter of a rule falls
within an agency's delegated authority, there are only two grounds
for a court upsetting it. First, the basis and purpose statement given
by the agency may include no reasons, or merely conclusory reasons,
for adopting the rule or for rejecting evidence, criticisms, or alter-
43. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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natives submitted by outsiders. In this instance, the agency has vio-
lated the third procedural step of section 553 and simultaneously has
violated the "substantive" standard of review by failing to show good
faith consideration "to all relevant factors." No matter how the
agency's default is labeled, however, the remedy is of course to re-
mand the rule. But such remand is only to allow the agency, through
fuller explanation, to show that the rulemaking process was actually
animated by reason rather than blind instinct. Since the "basis and
purpose" statement is part of the "record," as well as "procedure,"
this is in essence a remand for a fuller record. But it should be noted
that there are no suggestions that adjudicatory procedures are re-
quired.
Compare this with the ad hoc approach to procedural review
which assigns to the judiciary a relentlessly activist role. But the ad
hoc approach to administrative review lacks those foundations in law
and reason which an activist posture requires. The approach has no
statutory underpinnings; indeed, it flies in the face of the APA. It
can claim no constitutional mandate, and it certainly protects no
minority interests which the political system would otherwise ignore.
Furthermore, the ad hoc approach draws on no talents peculiar to
the judiciary. Although judges may have a professional attachment to
cross-examination and oral argument, they have no special expertise
in the procedure appropriate to bureaucratic policy making.
What reviewing courts can realistically do to improve rulemaking is
what the APA asks them to do-open the agencies to outside infor-
mation, challenge and scrutiny; sections 553 and 706 of the APA
provide the court with the powerful tools necessary to attack these
abuses of substantive judicial review.
SHANNAN CARTER
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